Abstract. We consider dynamic, two-player, zero-sum games where the minimizing" player seeks to drive an underlying nite-state dynamic system to a special terminal state along a least expected cost path. The maximizer" seeks to interfere with the minimizer's progress so as to maximize the expected total cost. We consider, for the rst time, undiscounted nite-state problems, with compact action spaces, and transition costs that are not strictly positive. We admit that there are policies for the minimizer which permit the maximizer to prolong the game inde nitely. Under assumptions which generalize deterministic shortest path problems, we establish i the existence of a real-valued equilibrium cost vector achievable with stationary policies for the opposing players and ii the convergence of value iteration and policy iteration to the unique solution of Bellman's equation.
1. The n-stage probability transition matrix P; n from non-terminal states to non-terminal states is a uniform contraction" in the stationary policy pairs ; of the two players. That is, for some 0, P; n has row-sums less than 1 , for all stationary policy pairs ; . Or, 2. The transition costs to the pursuer are uniformly bounded below b y 0 and there exists a stationary policy for the pursuer that makes P ; n a uniform contraction under all stationary policies for the evader. They show that there exists an equilibrium cost vector for the game which can be found through value iteration. In 10 , van der Wal considers a special case of Kushner and Chamberlain's games. Under more restrictive assumptions about the pursuer's ability to catch the evader, he gives error bounds for the updates in value iteration.
In 3 , Kumar and Shiau give a detailed analysis of stochastic games with very mild assumptions about the state space and control constraint sets. For the case of nonnegative additive cost with no discounting, they establish the existence of an extended real equilibrium cost vector in non-Markov randomized policies where for both players the best mixed action can depend on all of the past states and controls, as well as the current state. They show that the minimizing player can achieve the equilibrium using a stationary Markov randomized policy and that, in case the state space is nite, the maximizing player can play -optimally using stationary randomized policies.
Other researchers have studied so-called non-terminating" stochastic games also sometimes called undiscounted" stochastic games, where the costs are not discounted but are averaged instead. Such average-cost games have a rich mathematical structure which has been extensively covered in the literature 13, 5 . In this paper, we consider undiscounted additive cost games without averaging. We admit that there are policies for the minimizer which allow the maximizer to prolong the game inde nitely at in nite cost to the minimizer. We do not assume nonnegativity of cost, as in 4 and 3 . We make alternative assumptions which guarantee that, at least under optimal policies, the terminal state is reached with probability one. Our results imply the results of Shapley 7 , as well as those of Kushner and Chamberlain 4 . Because of our assumptions relating to termination, we are able to derive stronger conclusions than those made by Kumar and Shiau 3 for the case of a nite state space. Note that because we do not assume nonnegativity of the costs, the analysis is much more complicated than the corresponding analysis of Kushner and Chamberlain 4 . Our formal assumptions generalize to the case of twoplayers those for stochastic shortest path problems 2 . Because of this, we refer to our class of games as stochastic shortest path games." Our games are characterized by either i inevitable termination under all policies or ii an incentive for the minimizer to drive the system to termination in a nite expected number of stages. We shall see that the results of 2 are essential in developing our present theory.
In Section 2 we give a precise mathematical formulation for stochastic shortest path games. In Section 3, we relate our general formulation to Shapley's original games 7 . We develop our main results in Section 4. This is where we show that stochastic shortest path games have an equilibrium solution which can be characterized by the unique solution to Bellman's equation. We also prove the convergence of value iteration and policy iteration to the equilibrium cost. In Section 5, we give an example of pursuit and evasion, illustrating our main results. Finally, in the Appendix we collect some well known results about dynamic games which are crucial to our development. The limit above exists because the sequence for each i 2 S is monotonically nondecreasing and bounded above. We shall refer to a pair of policies M ; N as terminating with probability one if the corresponding Markov c hain terminates with probability one; otherwise, we refer to the pair as prolonging.
A stationary policy 2 M for the minimizer is said to be proper if the pair ; N is terminating with probability one for all N 2 N. A stationary policy is improper if it is not proper. If is improper then there is a policy for the maximizer 2 N under which there is a positive probability that the game will never end from some initial state. The designation of proper or improper applies only to stationary policies for the minimizer.
It is convenient to de ne the set X = fx 2 R n j x 1 = 0 g. This is the space of cost vectors over which our main results hold. We denote by 0 the zero vector in X. Let This follows from the Sion-Kakutani theorem see 8 , p.232 or 6 , p. 397. We will show in Section 3 that dynamic games with mixed" strategies over nite underlying action spaces satisfy this assumption.
To v erify that a stationary policy 2 M is proper, we need only check whether ; is terminating with probability one for all stationary policies 2 N for the maximizer. Furthermore, if 2 M is improper, then we can always nd a stationary policy 2 N for the maximizer which is prolonging when paired with . This is shown in the following lemma: Lemma 2.1. If 2 M is such that ; terminates with probability one for all 2 N, then is proper.
Proof. The proof uses the analysis of 2 . Let 2 M be a xed policy for the minimizer, and suppose that the pair ; is terminating with probability one for all stationary policies of the maximizer 2 N. With xed, the maximizer is faced with a stochastic shortest path problem of the type considered in 2 . The maximizer has no improper policies against . Now modify the problem such that the costs of transitioning from nonterminal states are all set to one but all of the transition probabilities are left unchanged. The assumptions of 2 remain satis ed, so the optimal expected cost for the maximizer in the new problem is bounded, even over nonstationary policies. Thus, the maximum expected number of stages to termination under is nite. This is true for both the modi ed problem and the original version of the game. This implies that is proper. Q.E.D. 3. Connection to Shapley's Stochastic Games. The mathematical formulation of the preceding section includes as a special case the stochastic games of Shapley. To see this, assume that the number of actions available to either player at any state is nite. As before, the players implement underlying actions simultaneously at each stage, with full knowledge of the state of the system but without knowledge of each other's current decision. However, the players are now allowed to randomize their decisions in formulating a policy so as to keep their opponents from adapting to a deterministic policy. That is, in considering what to do at each state, the players choose probability distributions over underlying control sets rather than speci c underlying control actions. In other words, the players use randomized or mixed" policies. The next lemma follows from the theory of one-player stochastic shortest paths. Lemma 4.1. Assume that all stationary policies for the minimizer are proper.
The operator T is a contraction mapping on the set X = fx 2 R n j x 1 = 0g with respect to a weighted sup-norm. Moreover, if 2 M is proper, then T i s a c ontraction mapping with respect to a weighted sup-norm.
Proof. We will show rst the result about T for the case that all stationary policies are proper. Our strategy is to identify a vector of weights w and to show that this set of weights is one for which T is a contraction with respect to k k w 1 .
Let us de ne a new one-player stochastic shortest path problem of the type considered in 2 . This problem is de ned such that the transition probabilities remain unchanged and the transition costs are all set equal to -1 for all states other than the terminal state. The important di erence is that the maximizer and minimizer work together" in the sense that the decision space for the single player of the new problem is over M N. This is a stochastic shortest path problem where all stationary policies are proper. Using the results of 2 , there is an optimal cost vectorx 2 X which can be achieved using a stationary policy ; 2 M N. Note where 0 is the zero vector in X. Thus, using preceding lemma and the de nition of
x, we h a ve x = lim t!1 T t+1 0 = x ; wherex is the unique xed point of the contraction mapping T within X, proving statement 1 .
Consider the following in nite-horizon stochastic shortest path problem for the maximizer: is prolonging and results in unbounded expected cost from some initial state when played against . Let x be an element i n X such that x T x. Then, applying T to x, w e h a ve that x T x c; + P; x; where the second inequality follows from the de nition of T . From the monotonicity of T , w e get x T x T 2 x T c; + P; x P; P; x + c; + P; c; ; where the last inequality follows again from the de nition of T . Proceeding inductively, using the same steps, we h a ve that for all t x T t x P; t+1 x + t X k=0 P; k c; :
On the other hand, because the policy results in in nite expected cost from some initial state when played against , some subsequence of P t k=0 P; k c; must have a coordinate that tends to in nity. The term involving x remains bounded because it is just x multiplied by the product of stochastic matrices. This contradicts the above inequality. Thus, must be proper. Q.E.D. 3. We haveT t
x !x for all x 2 X. If for all 2 M, the pair ; terminates with probability one, then the convergence is linear. Proof. This follows directly from the theory of one-player stochastic shortest path problems. Q.E.D.
4.3. Main Results for the Game. We n o w establish the main results of the paper: the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium solution, the convergence of value iteration, and the convergence of policy iteration.
Proposition 4.5. The operator T has a unique xed p oint x on X. Proof. We begin by showing that T has at most one xed point i n X. Suppose x and x 0 are both xed points of T in X. We can select 2 M and 0 2 M such that x = Tx = T x and x 0 = Tx 0 = T 0 x 0 . By Lemma 4.3, we h a ve that and 0 are proper. Lemma 4.2 implies that x = x and x 0 = x 0 . Since 0 isn't necessarily optimal with respect to x in applying the T operator, we h a ve from the monotonicity o f T that x = T t x T t 0 x for all t 0. Thus, by Lemma 4.2, we have that x lim t!1 T t 0 x = x 0 = x 0 . Similarly, x 0 x, which implies that x = x 0 and that T has at most one xed point i n X.
To Using the monotonicity o f T we h a ve that x Tx Tx x: Again from the monotonicity o f T, w e obtain for all t 1 that x T t,1 x T t x x: Thus, the sequence fT t xg converges to a vector x 1 2 X. From the continuity of T, w e h a ve that x 1 = Tx 1 . Thus, T has a xed point i n X. Q.E.D. Thus, x is the minimax cost of the xed policy with the immediate transition cost c ; replaced with c ; + . We h a ve that x = T x + T x : Thus, from the monotonicity o f T we h a ve that for all t 0 T t x x : By taking the limit as t ! 1 , w e see that x x . This is also implied by our interpretation of x above. Now using the monotonicity o f T and the fact that x = x , we get x = Tx Tx T x = x , x ;
Proceeding inductively, w e get x T t x T t,1 x x : Hence, fT t x g is a monotonically decreasing sequence bounded below which converges to somex 2 X. By continuity of the operator T, w e m ust have thatx = Tx. By the uniqueness of the xed point o f T, w e h a ve thatx = x .
We now examine the convergence of the operator T t applied to x , . Note that,
x , = Tx , Tx , Tx = x ; where the rst inequality follows from the fact that P; for all 2 M and 2 N. Once again monotonicity of T prevails, implying that T t x , is monotonically increasing and bounded above. From the continuity o f T we h a ve that lim t!1 T t x , = x .
We saw earlier that x = T x + and that x x . Then, from the monotonicity o f T
x T x + = x + : Thus, for any x 2 X we can nd 0 such that x , x x . By the monotonicity o f T, w e then have, T t x , T t x T t x ; 8 t 1: Taking limits, we see that lim t!1 T t x = x . Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.8. Given a proper stationary policy 0 2 M, we have that x k ! x ; where x is the unique equilibrium cost vector and f k g is a sequence of policies generated b y p olicy iteration such that Tx k = T k+1x k for all k. Since fx k g is monotonically decreasing and bounded below by x , we have that the entire sequence converges to some vector x 1 . From 4.6 and the continuity o f T, w e h a ve that x 1 = Tx 1 . Since x is the unique xed point o f T on X, w e h a ve that x k ! x . Q.E.D.
5. An Example of Pursuit and Evasion. Consider the following two-player game, played around a table with four corners. One player, the pursuer who is actually the minimizer, is attempting to catch" in minimum time the other player, the evader who is the maximizer. The game evolves in stages where, in each stage, both players implement actions simultaneously. When the players are across from one another, they each decide independently whether to stay where they are, move one corner clockwise, or move one corner counter-clockwise. When the two players are adjacent to one another, they each decide independently whether to stay where they are, move toward the other's current location, or move away from the other's current location. The pursuer catches the evader only by arranging to land on the same corner of the table as the evader. The possibility exists that, when they are adjacent, they can both move toward each other's current location. This does not result in the evader being caught in mid-air". The evader is slower than the pursuer in the sense that, when the evader decides to change location, he succeeds in doing so only with probability p 2 0; 1. With probability 1 , p, the evader will wind up not moving at all. Thus, the pursuer can ultimately catch the evader, provided he implements an appropriate policy such as always move t o ward the present location of the evader". On the other hand, there exist policies for the pursuer such as always stay put" which allow the maximizer to prolong the game inde nitely. This results in in nite cost i.e. in nite capture time to the pursuer.
This game ts into our framework for stochastic shortest path games. As described above there are three states: evader caught state 1, players adjacent to one another state 2, and players across from one another state 3. Thus, S = f1; 2; 3g.
Once the evader is caught, the game is over, so state 1 serves as the terminal state, which is zero cost and absorbing.
In state two, when the players are adjacent, the players may move toward the other's location action 1, stay where they are action 2, or move away from the other's location action 3. Thus, A2 = B2 = f1; 2; 3g. From the description of the problem given above, it is not hard to see that p 21 u; v = u 1 v 1 + v 3 The expected transition cost functions c 3 u; v take on the value of one for all u 2 U3 and v 2 V 3.
We will show that the equilibrium value of this stochastic shortest path game is given by In other words, as long as the evader chooses not to remain at his current location when the two players are adjacent, any mixed decision at state 2 for the evader is optimal. The pursuer does not have the same exibility; his optimal mixed decision is deterministic: always move t o ward the evader. On the other hand, any probability v ector u 2 U3 such that u 2 = 0 forms an equilibrium strategy for the pursuer. In other words, as long as the pursuer decides to not stay at his current location when the two players are across from one another, any mixed decision for the pursuer at state 3 is optimal. This time, it is the evader's strategy which is in exible. His optimal action is to stay at his current location. Thus, when both players play optimally, the game will always transition from state i = 3 t o i = 2 i n one stage. Happily, the equilibrium cost re ects this: x 3 = 2,p 1,p = 1 + x 2 . To verify that these are indeed equilibrium policies, we will show that x = Tx = T x = T x . Notice that the policy corresponds to one where the pursuer always decides to move in the direction of the current location of the evader. This policy is clearly proper. The desired result follows from Corollary 4.6.
Let us rst consider the case where the two players are adjacent i.e. state 2.
Let a general cost-to-go vector be given as x = 0 ; x 2 ; x 3 0 2 X. In other words, the second element of Tx is evaluated as the value of the matrix game in mixed strategies de ned by G 2 x. It is well known that the equilibrium cost and equilibrium strategies for a matrix game are characterized as the optimal value and solutions to a particular linear program and it's dual 12 . In particular, 1 Proof. The proof of this is exactly analogous to that given for Lemma A.4. The interchange of the max and min has no bearing on the logical ow of the argument.
Q.E.D. Thus, for nite-horizon games with or without a terminal state, an equilibrium cost exits and can be found via dynamic programming iterations.
